Ministerial Policy Dominance in Parliamentary Democracies
K. Jonathan Klüser
Christian Breunig
Abstract
To what extent do ministries dominate a particular policy domain? The policy dictator model and many
principle-agent models of governmental control that followed suit assume that governments create
ministries with clear and exclusive policy responsibilities. We test this assertion using data from
parliamentary bills from Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. For each bill, we observe its
substantial policy content and the responsible ministry. The data show that bills on similar issues
regularly are drafted by different ministries in parliamentary democracies. About 40 per cent of
policy issues cannot be ascribed to one dominant ministry. The regularities elucidate that
ministerial division of labour within governments is considerably more complex than commonly
assumed. The variegated level of ministerial dominance across policy domains calls for a new
research agenda on how governments assign responsibility for legislative action in parliamentary
democracies.
Type
Publication
European Journal of Political Research
Status
Peer-reviewed

Authors
K. Jonathan Klüser
(he/him)
Political Scientist
I study how political institutions, media, and digital platforms allocate attention —
which problems get taken up, who has the power to force an issue onto the agenda, and
what happens to democratic representation when that power shifts outside elected
institutions. My research spans three connected strands: executive institutions and
bureaucratic capacity, representation and economic inequality in party systems, and the
digital reallocation of attention through influencers, platform governance, and
deepfakes. I hold a PhD in Political Science from Aarhus University and currently lead
an SNSF Ambizione project at the University of Zurich.