From Bureaucratic Capacity to Legislation: How Ministerial Resources Shape Governments' Policymaking Capabilities
Abstract
How does ministries’ capacity to draft legislation affect the political output of modern
governments? This article combines a novel dataset describing the capacity of ministerial
bureaucracies to attend to about 250 distinct policy issues with content-coded data on government
legislation. The sample consists of Danish, Dutch and German governments, jointly spanning the time
from 1995 to 2013. The analysis reveals three main findings: firstly, issue-specific bureaucratic
capacity unconditionally increases governments’ legislative activity; secondly, legislative activity
is stifled if bureaucratic capacity is spread across different ministries; thirdly, against
theoretical expectations the productive effect of bureaucratic capacity is not positively related to
governments’ issue salience. The results indicate that the design and resources of ministerial
portfolios affect policy making in western governments.
Type
Publication
West European Politics
Status
Peer-reviewed
Awards
Gordon Smith and Vincent Wright Memorial Prize
WEP · 2023

Authors
K. Jonathan Klüser
(he/him)
Political Scientist
I study how political institutions, media, and digital platforms allocate attention —
which problems get taken up, who has the power to force an issue onto the agenda, and
what happens to democratic representation when that power shifts outside elected
institutions. My research spans three connected strands: executive institutions and
bureaucratic capacity, representation and economic inequality in party systems, and the
digital reallocation of attention through influencers, platform governance, and
deepfakes. I hold a PhD in Political Science from Aarhus University and currently lead
an SNSF Ambizione project at the University of Zurich.